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Vygotsky, Wittgenstein, and sociocultural theory 
 
Abstract  
This paper considers the use made of Vygotsky’s work by many who take a 
sociocultural perspective and, in particular, by those who use his work to 
advance a particular view of second language acquisition and the ‘silent 
period’. It is argued that Vygotsky’s account as represented in Thought and 
Language (Vygotsky, 1986) needs to be thought of as consisting of two 
distinct aspects: first, the observations he made (or claimed to have made) 
and, second, the theoretical account he proposed to explain them.  It is 
shown that some of Vygotsky’s observations are problematic but that, even 
if they are accepted, Vygotsky’s theoretical account suffers from 
fundamental difficulties.  Thus the support claimed from Vygotsky in 
accounts of second language acquisition is misplaced, first because of those 
difficulties and, second, because many who claim support from Vygotsky, 
do not need or even use his theory but instead focus their attention on his 
empirical observations and assume incorrectly that if their own empirical 
observations match Vygotsky’s, then Vygotsky’s theory can be accepted.  
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is shown to provide a perspective which 
dispels confusions about, and gives us a clearer insight into, the issues. 
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Vygotsky, first language acquisition, second 
language acquisition, sociocultural 
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Lt. Colin Race: This murder gets more complicated by the minute. 
Hercule Poirot: Mais oui. Which can only mean one thing, mon ami. The 
solution, it must be very simple.1 
 
Introduction:  
One of the most prominent names in sociocultural accounts and, in 
particular, those concerning second language acquisition (SLA) is that of Lev 
Vygotsky - the social, cultural and historical approach provided by Vygotsky is one 
of the bases for the “socio-cultural approach to the language and learning 
development of bilingual children” (Drury, 2013, p. 358) and “sociocultural 
theorizing [is] an essential element in the interpretation” of second language 
acquisition (Bligh & Drury, 2015, p. 261). Vygotsky is often linked to 
“sociocultural theory” (Aimin, 2013; Drury, 2013; Lantolf & Thorne, 2007); he has 
been termed the “founding father of sociocultural research” (Mercer, 2002, p. 141), 
and “the ‘father’ of SCT” [sociocultural theory] (Swain, Kinnear, & Steinman, 
2011, p. x). There can be no doubt that even if Vygotsky himself did not use the 
term ‘sociocultural’ (although Cole argues that “Vygotsky and his students called 
their approach a ‘sociocultural’ or ‘sociohistorical’ theory of psychological 
processes” (Cole, 1985, p. 148)), it is nevertheless a term firmly associated with his 
name.  It is, however, worth noting that “SCT was not originally intended as a 
theory of second language acquisition” (Swain et al., 2011, p. xvi), and there are 
good grounds for arguing that Vygotsky’s work is best seen as involving an account 
of first language acquisition (FLA) (F. Newman & Holzman, 2014, p. 109). 
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Consequently, an examination of Vygotsky’s account of language, and the use 
made of it by sociocultural theorists of SLA, would seem to be in order. 
The literature on SLA makes links to diverse theoretical perspectives 
concerning FLA.  It was suggested as long ago as 1977 that the relationship 
between FLA and SLA is not fully understood (Cook, 1977, online); Cook later 
arguing that, as far as FLA acquisition is concerned, there is “no single unifying 
model” (Cook, 2010/2013, p. 155).  This multiplicity of perspectives on FLA 
influences accounts of SLA where, according to Long, one of the problems facing 
progress in SLA is “theory proliferation” (Long, 2007, p. vii), with “as many as 60 
theories, models, hypotheses, and theoretical frameworks” (Long, 2007, p. 4), not 
all of them compatible (Long, 2007, p. 3). For one writer,  
These models might appear contradictory at first sight, but in fact they can be 
reconciled in so far as they are concerned with different aspects of SLA, 
which is, after all, a highly complex process (Myles, 2013). 
Others consider that these different theories are “contrasting and complementary” 
(Bligh, 2014, p. 41), each adding to the larger body of knowledge in order “to 
provide an adequate understanding of SLA” (Saville-Troike, 2006, p. 28).   
This notion of complexity is common in much of the literature concerning 
FLA and SLA; Soderman and Oshio (2008, p. 298) consider FLA “complex”, and 
Clark writes that “second-language acquisition is as complex as the acquisition of 
the first language but with a wide variety of variables added in” (Clark, 2000, p. 
184), this being one factor leading, presumably, to the “complexity of early years 
pedagogy” (Bligh, 2014, p. 12). Yet the nature of FLA, and the theories associated 
with it, are sometimes seen as unproblematic for understanding SLA; Parke and 
Drury, for example, merely note that a “full, ‘normal’ linguistic environment … is 
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essential for the development of language in young children” (Parke & Drury, 
2001, p. 125), leading them to the conjecture that “it does look as though there is a 
common storage of languages in the mind” (Parke & Drury, 2001, p. 126). Another 
example which sees the relationship between FLA and SLA as largely 
unproblematic comes from Clarke (2009), who writes: 
The first language … forms the foundation for all later language development 
(Clarke, 2009, p. 9). 
Similarly, in relation to language acquisition, Soderman and Oshio write:  
The process of becoming competent in a first language requires very young 
children to master: phonology (the sounds of the language); vocabulary (the 
words of the language); grammar (the way the words are ordered and put 
together); discourse (the way the sentences are put together); and pragmatics 
(the rules of how to use the language) … Though complex, a child’s initial 
foray into language development begins at birth as the child interacts with 
others, building both a receptive vocabulary and a phenomenal ability to 
express all of the other important pieces of their language in a fairly competent 
manner by the age of five (Soderman & Oshio, 2008, p. 298). 
Quite how children do ‘master’ phonology, grammar, discourse and pragmatics is 
left unexplained. 
One name conspicuous by its absence in much of the literature on SLA is 
that of Ludwig Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein, in his later work, took the view that 
philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language (Wittgenstein, 1958, § 109, p. 47e) 2. Put another way, philosophy, for 
Wittgenstein, could be seen as untying the knots in our understanding (Z, § 452, p. 
81e).  However, although the results of philosophy are simple, the activity of 
philosophy has to be as complicated as the knots it is trying to untie (Z, § 452, p. 
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81e).  It will be argued here that Vygotsky’s account as used by many sociocultural 
accounts of SLA does contain some significant ‘knots’ and that the approach 
Wittgenstein adopted can be helpful in identifying and untying them. 
Some qualifications are needed here. First, it is not to be supposed that the 
work of either Vygotsky or Wittgenstein can be conceived of as a consistent 
‘whole’. In the cases of both writers, there are significant changes in their work 
over time, as well as some continuities. As far as Vygotsky’s work is concerned, it 
has been argued that it can be divided into at least three stages or is, at least, not to 
be considered monolithic (González Rey, 2009, pp. 62-63). Some have argued that 
Vygotsky’s account not only evolved over time, but also contains contradictions 
(González Rey, 2009; Wertsch & Tulviste, 1992; Yasnitsky, 2011). One of the 
important aspects of Vygotsky’s works between 1928 and 1931 was the notion of 
internalization (González Rey, 2009, p. 62), a notion that, as I shall show, is 
prominent in sociocultural accounts of SLA. Its importance to many sociocultural 
accounts of SLA means that it deserves close attention here.  
Similarly, I follow the widely accepted view that Wittgenstein’s work can 
be divided into an early, a middle, and a later stage (Luckhardt, 1979; Monk, 1990). 
I shall base my use of Wittgenstein on his later work, and especially around the 
Philosophical Investigations, one of the few writings which Wittgenstein prepared 
for publication and with much of which he is thought to have been reasonably 
satisfied (Monk, 1990, pp. 363-364). 
A second qualification is closely related to the first. Many of both 
Vygotsky’s and Wittgenstein’s works have been published posthumously; some of 
their remarks may not have been intended for publication, and others have their 
origins in records of course notes (Malcolm, 1958/1984; Yasnitsky, 2011). One 
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example makes the point: Wittgenstein’s Vermischte Bemerkungen (Wittgenstein, 
1978), first published in German well after Wittgenstein’s death, has as a subtitle in 
a later translation into English under the title Culture and Value (Wittgenstein, 
1998) the phrase “A selection from the Posthumous Remains” of Wittgenstein’s 
writing. 
A third qualification is that the reader of both Vygotsky and Wittgenstein 
who is not fortunate enough to be able to read and understand their works in their 
original language, faces the issue of translation. Van der Veer and Yasnitsky 
(2011), for example, argue that many translations of Vygotsky’s work   
are marred by mistakes and outright falsifications…[and] tend to downplay 
the collaborative and experimental nature of his research (van der Veer & 
Yasnitsky, 2011, p. 475). 
It is also important that any translation captures the intended meanings and 
subtleties of the respective writer, of the cultural contexts which informed the 
writing (van der Veer & Yasnitsky, 2011, p. 475), and of subtle changes in the 
meanings of words since the translations were written (Yengoyan, 2003, p. 25). 
Thus, notwithstanding that Elizabeth Anscombe’s translation of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations is often “quoted all over the world as if it were 
verbatim Wittgenstein rather than a translation, being written in an English style 
which is itself compelling” (O’Grady, 2001), subsequent editions have often made 
changes to the translations, though not always receiving approval (Cartwright, 
2011). It is worth bearing in mind that in relation to the work of both Vygotsky and 
Wittgenstein  
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history always implies different interpretations, which are largely dependent 
on the interpreters’ own positions as well as the context from which such 
interpretations are produced (González Rey, 2009, p. 60). 
Both Wittgenstein and Vygotsky lived in times of great social and cultural changes. 
Vygotsky for example, lived during the Russian Revolution, and it seems this 
directly affected his work (González Rey, 2009; Yasnitsky, 2011).  The wider 
contexts of Vygotsky’s work have been described by others – see for example, 
Marginson and Dang (2017, pp. 116-117).  Wittgenstein too lived through times of 
great change, experiencing the First and Second World Wars for example, which 
impacted on him directly (Monk, 1990).   
With these caveats in mind, it is now necessary to give an overview of 
Vygotsky’s account as represented in Thought and Language (Vygotsky, 1986), 
following which I shall turn to show how it is used in at least some sociocultural 
accounts of SLA.   
Vygotsky 
For Vygotsky, the earliest stage of thought and speech are biological, based on an 
“innate, natural form of behaviour” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 94).  Vygotsky refers to 
Goethe, and Faust’s remark: “In the beginning was the deed” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 
255); Vygotsky writes that  
we can accept this version if we emphasize it differently: in the beginning was 
the deed. The word was not the beginning—action was there first; it is the end 
of development, crowning the deed (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 255). 
At this early stage, Vygotsky notes “the independence of the rudimentary 
intellectual reactions from language” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 81); they are 
“preintellectual” and “prelinguistic” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 83). Vygotsky writes that 
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“laughter, inarticulate sounds, movements, etc., are means of social contact from 
the first months of the child’s life” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 81).  Vygotsky claims that 
at this stage, an analogy can be drawn between human children and chimpanzees in 
that they have natural biological abilities which enable them to react to stimuli 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. 80).  
However, Vygotsky continues, after about two years, the child comes to 
have “the first dim realization of the purpose of speech” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 82), 
and (quoting Stern), to realise that “each thing has its name”  (Stern, 1914, p. 108, 
cited by Vygotsky, 1986, p. 82). Thus the child has moved onto the developmental 
continuum and is participating in External Speech (Berducci, 2004, p. 337). 
The components of this continuum have been well described by others (for 
example, Berducci, 2004) and so I shall confine myself here to a brief summary of 
the main components. At one end of this continuum is, according to Vygotsky, 
Written Speech. This 
is monologous; it is a conversation with a blank sheet of paper. Thus, writing 
requires a double abstraction: abstraction from the sound of speech and 
abstraction from the interlocutor (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 181). 
It is “the most mature and least abbreviated and predicated component of 
Vygotsky’s developmental continuum” (Berducci, 2004, p. 332). 
Next on the continuum is External Speech. This is “the form Vygotsky dubs 
as the source of all of the continuum’s components” (Berducci, 2004, p. 332) and 
consists, initially at least, of “speech addressed to the child by others” (Jones, 2009, 
p. 169), and “all forms of social interaction: lectures, conversations, arguments, and 
so on” (Berducci, 2004, p. 332). Vygotsky writes that,  
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In mastering external speech, the child starts from one word, then connects 
two or three words; a little later, he advances from simple sentences to more 
complicated ones, and finally to coherent speech made up of series of such 
sentences; in other words, he proceeds from a part to the whole. In regard to 
meaning, on the other hand, the first word of the child is a whole sentence 
(Vygotsky, 1986, pp. 218-219). 
This is by followed by Private Speech, sometimes called ‘egocentric speech’, which 
is, for Vygotsky, “the link between early socially communicative speech and 
mature inner speech” (Jones, 2009, p. 169). Private Speech has both an internal and 
external form (Berducci, 2004, p. 333).  We then come to Inner Speech, which is 
“speech for oneself… [whereas] external speech is for others” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 
225).  Inner Speech “is considered to be an important factor in the transition from 
thought to external speech” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 3) and, “compared with external 
speech, inner speech appears disconnected and incomplete” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 
235). This being so,  
the transition from inner speech to external speech is not a simple translation 
from one language into another. It cannot be achieved by merely vocalizing 
silent speech. It is a complex, dynamic process involving the transformation of 
the predicative, idiomatic structure of inner speech into syntactically 
articulated speech intelligible to others (Vygotsky, 1986, pp. 248-249). 
 The next stage on the continuum is Thought, which is “still more inward 
than inner speech” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 249). For Vygotsky, “every sentence that 
we say in real life has some kind of subtext, a thought hidden behind it” (Vygotsky, 
1986, p. 250). This, in turn, brings Vygotsky to Motivation: 
We come now to the last step in our analysis of inner planes of verbal thought. 
Thought is not the superior authority in this process. Thought is not begotten 
by thought; it is engendered by motivation… Behind every thought there is an 
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affective-volitional tendency, which holds the answer to the last “why” in the 
analysis of thinking (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 252). 
Together, these comprise the developmental continuum. 
There are three additional aspects of significance in consideration of 
Vygotsky’s continuum. One of these is the notion of ‘transformation’; significant 
because, for Vygotsky, the different components of the continuum are not different 
things, but best thought of as different aspects of one and the same thing (Berducci, 
2004, p. 337). A second notion is ‘internalisation’. Vygotsky believed that speech 
was a crucial aspect of the development of children’s thinking and acting and, in 
broad terms, believed that, through a process of ‘internalisation’, external speech 
(interpersonal communication) is transformed into ‘inner speech’ (Jones, 2009, p. 
167). A third notion of significance is that of abbreviation.  For Vygotsky, private 
speech is seen as an abbreviated form of external speech; “compared with external 
speech, inner speech appears disconnected and incomplete” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 
235); it has an “abbreviated character” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 235). For Vygotsky, 
this abbreviation has a specific characteristic: 
as egocentric [private] speech develops, it shows a tendency toward an 
altogether specific form of abbreviation, namely: omitting the subject of a 
sentence and all words connected with it, while preserving the predicate. This 
tendency toward predication appears in all our experiments with such 
regularity that we must assume it to be the basic form of syntax of inner 
speech (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236). 
Here Vygotsky presents three examples, in an attempt to show that they all support 
his notion of abbreviation.  He writes: 
The answer to “Would you like a cup of tea?” is never “No, I don't want a cup 
of tea,” but a simple “No.” Obviously, such a sentence is possible only 
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because its subject is tacitly understood by both parties. To “Has your brother 
read this book?” no one ever replies, “Yes, my brother has read this book.” 
The answer is a short “Yes,” or “Yes, he has.” Now let us imagine that several 
people are waiting for a bus. No one will say, on seeing the bus approach, 
“The bus for which we are waiting is coming.” The sentence is likely to be an 
abbreviated “Coming,” or some such expression, because the subject is plain 
from the situation (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236). 
Abbreviation increases as we move down the continuum from Written Speech (the 
least abbreviated) to Motivation (the most abbreviated) (Berducci, 2004, p. 333). 
Vygotsky makes some other observations of children. For example, he has 
noted that “in learning to speak, as in learning school subjects, imitation is 
indispensable” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 188), and that “what the child can do in 
cooperation today he can do alone tomorrow” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 188).  Vygotsky 
describes one set of observations thus: 
Having found that the mental age of two children was. let us say, eight, we 
gave each of them harder problems than he could manage on his own and 
provided some slight assistance: the first step in a solution, a leading question, 
or some other form of help.  We discovered that one child could, in 
cooperation, solve problems designed for twelve-year-olds, while the other 
could not go beyond problems intended for nine-year-olds. The discrepancy 
between a child’s actual mental age and the level he reaches in solving 
problems with assistance indicates the zone of his proximal development 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. 187). 
This aspect of Vygotsky’s account, the ‘zone of proximal development’, is one of 
the most popularly referred to aspects of Vygotsky’s account, though often 
misunderstood (Lantolf, Thorne, & Poehner, 2015, p. 214). I shall return to 
consider it again shortly. 
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Identifying the knots: Critiquing Vygotsky  
Having outlined some of the key aspects of Vygotsky’s account as represented in 
Thought and Language, it is my intention now to begin to identify some of the 
‘knots’ contained therein. The first of these ‘knots’ concerns the supposed empirical 
observations which Vygotsky uses to lend support to his thesis.  Vygotsky himself 
considered that a large part of his analysis was based on “fact-finding experiments” 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. lix), and these observations are often taken by others as lending 
credence to Vygotsky’s account. 
However, the supposed empirical basis of much of Vygotsky’s work is more 
transparent than real. In part, this is because his work does not consist of the results 
of a large number of empirical studies (Grigorenko, 2007, p. ix). Leaving this point 
to one side however, as a starting point, let us re-consider the examples that 
Vygotsky did give; of asking someone whether they would like a cup of tea, or of 
asking if your brother has read this book, or people waiting for a bus (Vygotsky, 
1986, p. 236).  The first point to make here is that to assert (as Vygotsky does) that 
‘No, I don’t want a cup of tea’ is never an answer to the question ‘Would you like a 
cup of tea?’, or that no one ever replies ‘Yes, my brother has read this book’ to the 
question ‘Has your brother read this book?’, or that no one waiting for a bus at a 
bus stop will say ‘The bus for which we are waiting is coming’ are statements that 
would seem, as empirical observations, problematic. Even if that is what Vygotsky 
has observed, if we take (or imagine) a “more varied diet of examples” (S. 
Newman, 1999, p. 94), it is easy to think of certain situations when exactly those 
phrases could be said, without seeming odd. In fact, this point is hinted at by 
Vygotsky when he makes a reference to the significance of “the situation” in which 
such phrases are used (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236).  Significant too, in terms of 
  
13 
 
examining the supposed empirical support Vygotsky claims for his account, is the 
fact that, after making the observation that human infants possess a priori 
biological abilities (Berducci, 2004, p. 337) and natural reactions (Berducci, 2004, 
p. 350), Vygotsky has used his observations of children learning a first language to 
infer the existence of the inner modes of Private Speech, Inner Speech, Thought, 
and Motivation (Berducci, 2004, pp. 350-351).  The attempted resolution of this 
problem, namely that the inner modes are transformations of the outer modes and 
can thus be seen directly (Berducci, 2004, pp. 344-345), merely assumes the 
continuum that it is meant to justify.  
The second ‘knot’ to begin to untie concerns Vygotsky’s notion of 
‘abbreviation’.  As has already been noted, the examples Vygotsky gives of 
abbreviation in dialogues are dependent on contextual understandings (Wertsch, 
1985, p. 123).  However, they do not provide any evidence for the abbreviation 
thesis (Jones, 2009, p. 170); they just make a range of assumptions which cannot be 
justified (Jones, 2009, pp. 169-172).  In arguing that private speech shows “a 
tendency toward an altogether specific form of abbreviation, namely: omitting the 
subject of a sentence and all words connected with it, while preserving the 
predicate” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236), Vygotsky seems to suggest that the child has a 
fully formed sentence worked out as it would appear in social speech, and then 
decides to drop some particular parts of it (Jones, 2009, p. 169).  Just such a 
proposition is suggested by Lantolf and Pavlenko (1995, p. 111) when they give the 
example of a speaker trying to solve a jigsaw puzzle who utters the word ‘Green’.  
This utterance, they argue, is an abbreviated version of “The next piece I need to 
place into the puzzle is the green one”, or something similar.  Does the child or 
other speaker have to work out the fully fledged version of social speech before 
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dropping some of it? How can we decide what a complete unabbreviated sentence 
might be, devoid of any context? Why start with one fully fledged version of a 
sentence rather than another? If we do consider one expansion of an abbreviated 
sentence to be appropriate, it can only be because we have already worked out the 
use (Jones, 2009, p. 172). Clearly then, as Jones puts it, “if you cannot decide or 
cannot find good reasons for starting with one ‘expanded’ form rather than another, 
then the whole abbreviation hypothesis is in some trouble” (Jones, 2009, p. 171). 
It may well be, as has been suggested to me, that, in Russian, answers to 
certain questions are rather curt and abrupt and that this needs to be taken into 
account when discussing Vygotsky’s notion of abbreviation. However, even if this 
is the case, first, the examples Vygotsky gives in Thought and Language are not 
dissimilar to those we might find used in English, and so the examples seem to have 
the ring of authenticity to them, even within a different context and language. 
Second, we can easily imagine contexts in which the longer answer might be given 
and so, in that regard, we may want to question Vygotsky’s assertion that we would 
‘never’ use the longer forms.  A third point is that these observations are irrelevant 
to the posit of the so-called continuum. 
A third ‘knot’ that needs to be untied concerns Vygotsky’s theory of 
meaning.  Vygotsky’s arguments need to be seen within a wider view of language 
(Jones, 2009, p. 168).  Despite the fact that Vygotsky’s theory of meaning is an 
“essential aspect” of his work (Mahn, 2013, p. 6), it has often been ignored or at 
least largely overlooked by those who rely on his work, not least by those using 
Vygotsky in their work on SLA (Mahn, 2013, p. 6).  Yet, as Vygotsky himself 
noted, 
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One might say without exaggeration that the whole structure of a theory is 
determined by its translation of the first words of the child (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 
64). 
However, Vygotsky’s theory of meaning encounters several difficulties, as has been 
pointed out by Williams (Williams, 1999, p. 274). How does the word come to refer 
to a particular object, or to have a particular sense? How does a word refer to an 
object, as opposed to merely being associated with it? What is it for a word to have 
meaning? Williams argues that Vygotsky cannot have recourse to the child’s 
intellect or understanding to explain these things, because these are the very things 
his theory proposes are only developed as a result of such activity. Thus, as 
Williams points out, “reference and sense presuppose the very phenomena they are 
intended to make possible” (Williams, 1999, p. 274).  When we look again at the 
quotations from Vygotsky given above, and elsewhere from his work, we see that 
there is no explanation of this process. The child “seems to have discovered the 
symbolic function of words” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 82 (emphasis added)) but we are 
not told how; a child ‘grasps’ the external structure, and later the inner structure 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. 61), but again, we are not told how.  What are the ‘basic 
intellectual functions’, and how do words and signs “direct our mental operations, 
control their course, and channel them toward the solution of the problem 
confronting us” (Vygotsky, 1986, pp. 106-107)? How does the child’s speech come 
to have a signifying function?  And what are we to make of Vygotsky’s remark, 
that the first step towards concept formation is when the child 
puts together a number of objects in an unorganized… heap, consisting of 
disparate objects grouped together without any basis, [which] reveals a 
diffuse, undirected extension of the meaning of the sign (artificial word) to 
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inherently unrelated objects linked by chance in the child’s perception [and 
where] 
At that stage, word meaning denotes nothing more to the child than a vague … 
conglomeration of individual objects that have somehow or other coalesced 
into an image in his mind (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 110  (Vygotsky's emphases 
omitted, and mine added))? 
Thus the claim that a sociocultural approach based on Vygotsky’s work in Thought 
and Language “assists in recognizing the complexities involved in comprehending 
how new understandings and ways of knowing (meaning making) are acquired” 
(Bligh & Drury, 2015, p. 262) is to be rejected. Moreover, when one reads 
sociocultural accounts of SLA which claim to show Vygotsky’s modes in practice 
(for example, the claim of Swain, Kinnear, and Steinman (2011, p. xiii) that they 
are going to present “narratives to demonstrate SCT concepts-in-context”, or the 
vignettes of Nazma and Nina (Bligh & Drury, 2015; Drury, 2000, 2013) and of 
Suki and Adyta (Bligh, 2012, 2014; Bligh & Drury, 2015)), one is struck by the fact 
that they provide no evidence of Vygotsky’s ‘inner modes’.  This is not surprising, 
for no amount of empirical work can demonstrate that Vygotsky’s developmental 
continuum exists. In addition, the idea that Vygotsky’s is a social theory of 
meaning is to be rejected; at heart, it is an individualistic theory of meaning 
(Williams, 1999, p. 275). 
At this point, I return to consider in passing the ‘zone of proximal 
development’. As was noted earlier, this is a term used by Vygotsky as a result of 
the observation that a child can often achieve more when given guidance than 
another who is not (Vygotsky, 1986, pp. 186-187). In this context, it is important to 
note again that the observations made, and the labels attached to them, are not 
evidence of Vygotsky’s inferred continuum.   
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Untying the knots: Wittgenstein 
I turn now to consider the work of the person I identified earlier as being 
conspicuous by its absence from the literature on SLA, namely that of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein.  In particular, attention will be focussed here on work representing his 
later philosophy, particularly that in Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 
1958), (henceforth PI). My approach takes the view that any epistemology 
presupposes a theory of meaning. As indicative of this approach, I claim support 
from McGinn, who argues that 
the philosophy of language is … for Wittgenstein…to be conceived as anterior 
and foundational. We need to be clear about the nature of meaning before we 
can hope to be clear about anything else. It follows that if we are to be in a 
position to understand and assess Wittgenstein’s philosophy we need to 
acquire a firm grasp of his view of language (McGinn, 1984, p. xi).   
Wittgenstein did not conduct empirical research, nor did he claim to, as his 
work was concerned with clearing up conceptual confusions. However, in his work 
he brings forward many examples; some real; some imaginary (Malcolm, 
1958/1984, p. 27). His purpose in so doing was to dispel confusions caused by our 
failure to command a clear view of our language; “it disperses the fog to study the 
phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can 
command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words” (PI, § 5, p. 4e).  
The many and diverse examples thus counteract our tendency to ask questions and 
make statements which ignore our actual uses of language (PI, §§ 23-27, pp. 11e-
13e): 
A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s 
thinking with only one kind of example (PI, § 593, p. 155e). 
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Wittgenstein was advancing a multitude of examples in an attempt to remind the 
reader that things which look the same may be different: 
We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday 
language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike 
(PI, p. 224e). 
The initial stages of learning language for Wittgenstein have similarities to 
Vygotsky’s account. Indeed, the quote from Faust makes a reappearance in 
consideration of Wittgenstein’s approach, Monk arguing that 
His [Wittgenstein’s] attitude is summed up by Goethe’s line in Faust: ... ‘In 
the beginning was the deed’ ... which he quotes with approval, and which 
might, with some justification, be regarded as the motto of On Certainty—
and, indeed, of the whole of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (Monk, 1990, p. 
579). 
In the case of infants who have yet to acquire a first language, they cannot ‘mean’ 
anything by any linguistic or non-linguistic behaviour.  This follows from 
Wittgenstein’s arguments against private languages, which I have elaborated 
elsewhere (S. Newman, 1999, pp. 98-106). Wittgenstein reminds us that there are 
natural expressions of anger, fear and so on.  A human may cry, may limp, may 
hold an injured arm, may moan—these are ‘primitive expressions’ of pain.  
Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that concepts such as being naughty, friendly, thankful, 
desiring something, reacting to something (a noise, an animal, to something hot or 
cold, being surprised or afraid), have meaning by being used by others to describe 
certain behaviour in certain circumstances (Malcolm, 1981, pp. 1-7), and not by 
describing an underlying psychological state or process.  For Wittgenstein, the 
origin of language is grounded in primitive reactions. 
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At what point then, it might be asked, can a child be said to have acquired a 
first language? By what criteria is such an acquisition to be judged and by whom? 
Perhaps such questions assume that a child’s first language is purely verbal, and 
that somehow the language has to be acquired in its entirety (whatever that could 
mean) before one could say it has been acquired.  
A Wittgensteinian account recognises the significance of non-verbal 
language (i.e. behaviour). Thus when an infant behaves in this or that way, the 
infant does not mean anything by that behaviour, but that behaviour may be taken 
as meaningful by others. If, following Wittgenstein, we allow ‘language’ to include 
the non-verbal (see, for example, Gilroy, 1996, pp. 156-164), then we do not have 
to assume that a meaning exists ‘behind’ or ‘beneath’ an infant’s behaviour.  We 
merely recognise that many of these behaviours are natural to human infants qua 
human infants. On this view, instead of thinking that a neonate wants to 
communicate hunger, thirst, separation anxiety, and so on, we can take as our 
starting point that hungry neonates often behave like this, that thirsty neonates will 
often behave like that, and that anxious neonates will often behave in some other 
way.  The infant just behaves, and the meaning is attributed by others. It is a natural 
instinctive behaviour that neonates seek the breast when hungry and pull away 
when full; they may indeed cry for no apparent reason and become calm when 
cuddled. In one context, we might want to say an infant is non-verbal; in another, 
we might not. It might be that a child makes a sound which is interpreted by others 
as meaning something; it may be that they remain silent and that this too is 
interpreted by others as being meaningful. Whether they do so take the behaviour as 
meaningful (and, indeed, whether they say that the child has acquired a first 
language) would depend on the behaviours and the contexts. 
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With the Wittgensteinian perspective, we are thus led to the idea that it is 
the whole context which provides the ‘frame of reference’ for deciding on the 
meaning of a particular linguistic or non-linguistic behaviour (Pears, 1988, p. 279).  
We observe gestures, actions, expressions, tone of voice, and the like: 
I know that a sick man is lying here?  Nonsense!  I am sitting at his bedside, I 
am looking attentively into his face.—So I don’t know, then, that there is a 
sick man lying here?  Neither the question nor the assertion make any sense ... 
And “I know that there’s a sick man lying here”, used in an unsuitable 
situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only 
because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it (OC, § 10, p. 3e). 
What we need to attend to is the context in which the behaviour occurs. If 
I just assume with some degree of certainty that he has pain although I have 
no reason ... for it ... [and] sent them all to the doctor although they showed no 
sign of pain (illness), I should just be called mad (PESD, p. 291). 
We can on occasions see pain-behaviour in others and doubt that they are in pain, 
and there may also be occasions when someone could be in pain, or angry, with no 
outward expression of that pain or anger, but the criteria are (conventionally) 
necessarily good evidence in normal circumstances rather than conclusive evidence 
in all circumstances (PI, § 33, p. 16e; § 87, pp.40e-41e):   
The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game (PI, p. 224e). 
 
“While you can have complete certainty about someone else’s state of mind, 
still it is always merely subjective, not objective, certainty.”—These two 
words betoken a difference between language-games (PI, p. 225e). 
It is thus “our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game” (OC, § 204, p. 
28e), and provides the grounding where  
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the infant, qua potential communicator, has certain of its functional (that is, 
primitive means/ends), non-verbal behaviours treated as verbal 
communicative behaviours through the shared medium of the non-verbal 
(Gilroy, 1996, p. 161). 
Such a description may initially seem consistent with the view of Vygotsky, 
especially in the case of infants.  But, as Berducci points out, a key difference here 
to remember is that, for Wittgenstein, infants come to obey public rules whereas, 
for Vygotsky, infants “come to obey their own internal rules…through applying the 
internal modes of Vygotsky’s continuum” (Berducci, 2004, p. 340).  We can see 
Vygotsky’s stance in the assertion that  
Vygotsky’s theory of cognitive development … is reflected in the construct of 
the zone of proximal development (ZPD), in which knowledge is constructed 
first on a social plane (interpsychological) and then internalized … on an 
individual level (intrapsychological) (Sluss & Stremmel, 2004, p. 293). 
In contrast, Wittgenstein reminds us that language is part of a social whole, 
consisting of both verbal and non-verbal behaviours in specific contexts, in 
particular times and places (PI, § 7, § 23), where linguistic and non-linguistic 
behaviour “are woven together into an intricate organic whole” (Pitcher, 1964, p. 
240). It is that whole context or ‘language-game’ that provides the ‘frame of 
reference’ for deciding on the meaning of a particular linguistic or non-linguistic 
behaviour (Berducci, 2004, p. 342).  The rules which provide that ‘frame of 
reference’ for any particular language-game may be implicit or explicit; clear or 
opaque. Sometimes they are just used; sometimes they need to be explained 
(Gilroy, 2012, p. 56); meanings “are rule and criteria dependent in subtle and 
complex ways” (Gilroy, 2012, p. 56).  These “elusive networks” (Thomas, Shah, & 
Thornton, 2009, p. 15) of rules form the ‘grammar’ of the language, that is:  
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a set of locally agreed conventions or customs accepted by native language 
speakers, and which are important in enabling them to make sense of each 
other’s utterances (Thomas et al., 2009, p. 16) 
where 
the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (PI, § 23, p. 
11e). 
How then does the infant move from this pre-intellectual phase to have 
language?  How does the child begin to “master his [or her] surroundings with the 
help of speech” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 25)?  With a Wittgensteinian perspective, 
learning new meanings may be achieved in a variety of ways. We may begin to 
pick up the rules of a language-game by imitation, participation, by observation, or 
by ‘trial and error’. We may in the first instance, imitate others around us – this can 
be considered as where we are beginning to play a language-game without a full 
understanding of the rules. The rules of a language-game may be written down and 
codified to help us begin to know what they are and to understand them.  On 
occasions, an explicit explanation or demonstration of the rules of that language-
game may be helpful.  Applying this approach to the examples that Vygotsky gave 
to support his notion of abbreviation, we can see that the so-called ‘zone of 
proximal development’ is nothing more than a label that can remind us that we, and 
others, can often solve problems and learn more with assistance that we could 
alone. The observation that this is so does not support, and does not require, 
Vygotsky’s theoretical arguments. There is no need to posit some internal aspects 
of a supposed developmental continuum, as Vygotsky does (Berducci, 2004, p. 
347).  When we encounter a new ‘language-game’, we may well be surprised, 
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confused, unsure what is expected of us. The actions and words of an unfamiliar 
language-game will have some differences to those we have encountered in other 
language-games with which we are more familiar. We may feel stressed or worried, 
or perhaps excited. In the case of second language acquisition then, we may expect 
most or all of the verbal and written language to be different, as well as in some 
cases, the wider context or ‘language-game’. Take, for example, the vignettes of 
Drury and Bligh to which reference has already been made. These are all examples 
of additional language acquisition, and so it is, by definition, the case that Suki, 
Tamsin, and Adyta (and others) were, at the time of the observations, users of their 
respective first languages. What they may be less clear about is the nature of the 
various ‘rules’ of the social contexts or ‘language-games’ in which they find 
themselves.  In the descriptions of Nazma entering nursery (Bligh & Drury, 2015; 
Drury, 2007, 2013), we see that it is not just the verbal (additional) language that is 
new, but also the language-game, i.e. the whole social context.  Nazma is a relative 
newcomer to the nursery setting (Drury, 2013, p. 381) and the sorts of behaviours 
described are entirely consistent with what might be expected of a such a newcomer 
to that particular language-game.  We do not need to invoke Vygotsky’s 
developmental continuum to conclude that Nazma is “clearly distressed by the early 
transition from home to school” (Drury, 2013, p. 383); it is obvious from 
everything that is happening in the context. We see the importance of social 
interaction and imitation in SLA (Saville-Troike, 1988, pp. 578-579), of actions as 
well as words in particular contexts (Saville-Troike, 1988, pp. 579-581), and of 
trying out new sounds and new words (Saville-Troike, 1988, p. 586).  As Clarke 
argues, “children learning English as a second language need explicit modelling 
and language teaching” (Clarke, 2009, p. 7). True; sometimes speakers of a 
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language may make no eye contact with others and have no apparent expectation of 
a response (Saville-Troike, 1988, p. 573). It is not surprising that in such 
circumstances, “children become reluctant to interact socially in their second 
language” (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 1995, p. 114).  Such behaviours “may be 
interpreted” (Saville-Troike, 1988, p. 587, emphasis added) as support for 
Vygotsky’s account, but they do not provide evidence of its veracity. It may be that 
the ‘silent period’ marks a period in SLA when “linguistic development…has ‘gone 
underground’, so to speak” (Saville-Troike, 1988, p. 568, emphasis added), when 
these learners “appeared to talk to themselves” (Saville-Troike, 1988, p. 568, 
emphasis added). We may describe certain behaviour as showing ‘private speech’ if 
we like. But that phrasing presents us with a misleading picture. Thus, a 
sociocultural perspective that seeks to “problematize” the ‘silent period’ (Bligh & 
Drury, 2015, p. 259), and then 
articulates the silent period in terms of the child actively participating through 
her/his inner thoughts—deep in her or his mind through internalization of the 
spoken word (Bligh & Drury, 2015, p. 271) 
and where, in Vygotsky’s view (Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005, p. 104), “private 
speech represents a stage in the gradual internalisation of interpersonal linguistic 
exchanges whose final ontogenetic destination is inner speech, or verbal thought”, 
is seen from a Wittgensteinian perspective to be describing the situation in a 
misleading way.  Far from Vygotsky’s work providing “additional understandings 
on how a bilingual learner creates meaning” (Bligh, 2014, p. 11), we can now see 
that it creates additional misunderstandings. The studies of Nazma and Nina (Bligh 
& Drury, 2015; Drury, 2000, 2013), and of Suki and Adyta (Bligh, 2012, 2014; 
Bligh & Drury, 2015), merely remind us that we  
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need explicitly to recognise that the human ability to develop and share 
meanings develops from organic social interactions in which children freely 
respond to partners with whom they are flexibly and authentically engaged in 
activity and related conversation (Jarvis, Newman, & Swiniarski, 2014, p. 56). 
A perspective informed by Wittgenstein’s reminders is therefore consistent with the 
empirical observations that have been made, and is capable of dealing with real-life 
examples (such as the one referred to by Saville-Troike (1988, p. 588)) which do 
not seem to be predictable using Vygotsky’s account.  It is the Wittgensteinian 
approach, not Vygotsky’s, which successfully “focusses on the inextricable link 
between culture and cognition through engagement in activities, tasks, or events” 
(Gregory, 2008, p. 2, cited by Bligh and Drury, 2015, p. 262).  We can see this 
inextricable link by reconsidering Vygotsky’s assertions concerning abbreviation; 
contrary to Vygotsky’s assertions, the answer to ‘Would you like a cup of tea?’ 
could be ‘No, I don't want a cup of tea’; that the answer to the question ‘Has your 
brother read this book?’ could be ‘Yes, my brother has read this book’, and that in 
the case of several people waiting for a bus, that someone could indeed say, on 
seeing the bus approach, ‘The bus for which we are waiting is coming’. We just 
have to imagine different contexts in which such replies could be given. Even if an 
answer was abbreviated as Vygotsky suggests, this is 
not because it leaves out something that we think when we utter it, but 
because it is shortened—in comparison with a particular paradigm of our 
grammar. —Of course one might object here: “You grant that the shortened 
and the unshortened sentences have the same sense.—What is this sense, 
then? Isn’t there a verbal expression for this sense?”——But doesn’t the fact 
that sentences have the same sense consist in their having the same use? (PI, 
§20, p.10e).  
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Concluding remarks 
It is certainly the case that “no psychological theory is more explicitly dependent on 
ideas about language and communication than Vygotsky’s” (Jones, 2016, p. 2). Yet 
the issues in his work identified above call into question the uncritical use of 
Vygotsky’s work in support of a sociocultural account of SLA and of the so-called 
‘silent period’.  How far and in what direction Vygotsky’s ideas evolved in the later 
stages of his work are a matter of debate (see, for example, Jones (2016), González 
Rey & Martínez (2016), and Veresov (2017)).  Nevertheless, it has been argued 
here that it is Wittgenstein’s account, not the one of Vygotsky’s which has been 
examined, which offers a sociocultural perspective, is supported by observations, 
and provides a coherent account of meaning.  With such a reinterpretation, which 
recognises the significance of verbal and non-verbal language, we can see that it is 
an account of first and second language acquisition based on Wittgenstein’s 
reminders that “erases the boundary between language learning and language 
using” (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 1995, p. 116), and that “situates the locus of learning 
in the dialogic interactions that arise between socially constituted individuals 
engaged in activities” (Lantolf & Pavlenko, 1995, p. 116), with the wider 
perspective of ‘dialogic’ provided by the later Wittgenstein.  A perspective based 
on Wittgenstein’s reminders is fully in accord with the notion that learners of a 
second language are “located in a social context, moving from …apprenticeship to 
situated learning and …to peripheral participation” (Bligh & Drury, 2015, p. 262), 
and onwards, presumably, to full participation.  We do not need “psychological 
meta-concepts” (Berducci, 2004, p. 351); we make our judgements of whether 
people are (for example) in pain, motivated, happy, upset, and so on in particular 
circumstances (Berducci, 2004, pp. 346-347).  We can recognise that “learning and 
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teaching combine as an essentially social process that is situated within, and shaped 
by, social and cultural contexts” (Bligh & Fathima, 2017, p. 530), and that 
“collaboration and participation with knowledgeable others” (Bligh & Fathima, 
2017, p. 531) can help children to learn, and helps us to make sense of the notions 
of “apprenticeship, guided participation, and participatory appropriation” (Bligh & 
Fathima, 2017, p. 531).  None of the observations of how imitation, observation, 
trying things out, discussion, and other forms of social interaction, including play 
(Mathis, 2016, p. 626), can help learning (Bligh & Fathima, 2017, pp. 538-545) are 
explained by Vygotsky’s theoretical account, and none of them need Vygotsky’s 
theoretical account to be explicable.  
It was noted earlier that many theoretical accounts have been drawn on by 
those interested in SLA, and that the prevailing view of FLA and SLA amongst 
such writers is that both FLA and SLA are “highly complex” (Myles, 2013).  That 
supposed complexity as exhibited in Vygotsky’s account in Thought and Language 
has been shown to be based on misunderstandings about language acquisition. 
Returning to Wittgenstein’s remark that philosophy is concerned with untying knots 
in our understanding (Z, § 452), we have seen that, although the results of 
philosophy are simple, the activity of philosophising must be as complicated as the 
knots it unties. But, as Malcolm (1971, p. xi) put it, once these knots have been 
untied, what we are left with is “not a theory but simply—no knots!”. 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. This quotation is taken from the screenplay for Agatha Christie’s Poirot: The 
Clocks by Stewart Harcourt, dramatizing Agatha Christie’s The Clocks (Christie, 
1963). 
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2. In view of the posthumous publication of most of Wittgenstein’s work, the 
conventional referencing system has, for in-text references and citations of 
Wittgenstein’s work, been abandoned in favour of the following abbreviations, as 
is now customary (Stickney & Peters, 2017, p. 6) for that purpose. 
PESD: Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data” 
(Wittgenstein, 1968), written 1934-1936. 
PI: Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1958), first published in 1953, 
written 1945-1949. 
OC: On Certainty (Wittgenstein, 1969), written 1949-1951. 
Z: Zettel (Wittgenstein, 1967), written 1945-1948. 
Paragraph numbers (where applicable) are shown thus: § 
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